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MUST A SOLE SELF-REGULATOR IN THE SECURITIES
INDUSTRY AWAIT AN IN-PLACE CENTRAL
MARKET SYSTEM?
DAVID M. GARODNICK*
INTRODUCTION

Today, securties industry regulatidn subjects its constituent broker/dealers'
and associated persons2 to a burdensome scheme of overlapping and duplicative surveillance 3 by numerous governmental agencies and self-regulatory organizations. 4 Directly or indirectly, this heterogeneous industry must comply
with a myriad of federal and state securities laws, rules and regulations of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.), by-laws and rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (N.A.S.D.),5 and the constitution
and regulations of one or more of the various registered national securities
exchanges. 6
*B.S. 1957, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1961, Seton Hall University; Assistant Professor, Department of Law, School of Business and Public Administration of the Bernard M.
Baruch College of the City University of New York; Member, The New Jersey Bar.
1. "Broker': is defined as any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in
securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank. "Dealer" means any person
engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account, through a
broker or otherwise. The term "dealer" does not include a bank or any person insofar as he
buys and sells securities for his own account, either individually or in some fiduciary capacity,
but not as a regular business. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §3(a)(4)(5), 15 U.S.C.
§78c(a)(4)(5) (1934).
2. "Person associated with a broker or dealer" is defined as any partner, officer, director,
or branch manager of such broker or dealer (see note 1 supra), or any person occupying
similar status or performing similar functions, or any person directly or indirectly controlling
or controlled by such a broker or dealer. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §3(a)(18), 15
U.S.C. §78c(a)(18) (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §78o(b) (1964).
3. A broker/dealer is open to routine and/or special examinations by every self-regulatory organization (SRO) to which it belongs. Although some regulatory overlap has been
eliminated by cooperative efforts of the SRO's, it is still not inconceivable for a broker/dealer
to be subject -to review by the Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.), the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (N.A.S.D.), and other various exchanges. For example,
such overlap may occur where there is excessive trading activity in customer accounts ahd
some of the securities involved are listed on an exchange, while others are traded solely in
the over-the-counter market. In this situation it would not be unusual to expect regulatory
review by several agencies, either on their own initiative or as a result of a customer complaint.
4. These self-regulatory organizations are usually defined as the registered national
securities exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NA.S.D.). See
notes 6 and 13 infra.
5. See note 13 infra.
6. "Exchange" is defined as any organization, association, or group of persons, whether
incorporated or unincorporated, which constitutes, maintains, or provides a marketplace or
facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing,
with respect to securities, the functions commonly performed by a stock exchange as that
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The designation "self-regulatory organization" (SRO) applies to the
N.A.S.D. and those national securities exchanges that police their respective
members under S.E.C. supervision. Membership in an SRO is determined by
the marketplace7 in which a broker/dealer functions. If it operates in more
than one market, the broker/dealer is subject to overlapping regulation by
each of the organizations to which it belongs. Recognizing the waste and inefficiency8 inherent in this repetitious and expensive scheme of regulation,
Congress and the S.E.C. have endeavored to alleviate this burden by adopting
ameliorative provisions in the 1975 amendments to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 9 Additionally, they have promulgated rules under these provisions,' which call upon the SRO's to propose plans for allocating among
themselves specified regulatory responsibilities with respect to common members or participants.
The following analysis focuses on one such proposal and examines the
viability and desirability of a sole self-regulator" in the securities industry.
CONCEPT OF A SOLE SELF-REGULATOR

In response to a request from the National Market Advisory Board-2 for its

views on the establishment, operation, and regulation of a national market
system, the N.A.S.D. 1" concluded that: ". . . the concept of a sole self-regulator
term is generally understood, and includes the marketplace and the market facilities maintained by such exchange. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(l) (1934).
7. Stock exchanges are characterized as "auction" market centers for trading in securities
that are listed with them. Trading is conducted on the floor of the exchange in the manner
of a two-sided auction with competition among buyers and sellers. The over-the-counter
securities market is neither limited in the securities which may be bought and sold nor is it
housed in any one location. Traders in this market are connected by a vast system of telephonic and telegraphic communications. (See note 44 infra). Ordinarily those securities
transactions that are not made on stock exchanges take place over-the-counter in a primarily
"negotiated" market where buyers and sellers seek each other out and negotiate prices on
the most favorable terms available.
8. Utilizing the 1974 budgets of the major SRO's, the N.A.S.D. calculated that 30.5
million dollars had been spent for self-regulatory purposes that year, including regulatory,
administrative, and support costs. It estimated that possible savings which would result from
a sole self-regulator would be 7.7 million dollars. See SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) AA-3 (Apr.
30, 1977).
9. Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§77d, 77x, 77yyy, 78a (1975)).
10. S.E.C. Rule 17d-2, 17 C.F.R. 24 0.1 9g2-1 (1977), discussed in Release No. 34-12935
(effective Dec. 15, 1976). See also S.E.C. Rule 19(g)2-1, Release No. 34-12994 (effective Dec.
20, 1976).
11. The term "sole self-regulator" is defined as an organization with full rulemaking
authority, subject to S.E.C. approval, and charged with the responsibility of regulating the
activities of all registered broker/dealers that are members of an SRO. See N.A.S.D., infra
note 14, at 1.
12. This Board was appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.) under
the congressional mandate of the 1975 amendments to the Securities Acts. See Pub. L. No.
94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§77d, 77x, 77yyy, 78a (1975)). The Board recommends to the S.E.C. the steps deemed necessary to facilitate establishment of a national
market system.
13. The N.A.S.D. is a self-regulatory association of broker/dealers established pursuant
to the Maloney Amendment (1938) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Pub. L. No.
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is viable and feasible and that substantial savings in industry expenditures for
turposes of regulation would result if such were implemented. Political considerations could, however, have a significant effect, upon the implementation
of the concept and the timing thereof."'14 The concept is based on the premise
that a sole self-regulator (SSR) would minimize or eliminate regulatory overlap and duplication, allow for greater consistency of action in the rule-making
and disciplinary areas, and bring about, by consolidation of functions, certain
economies of scale.' 5
In December, 1976, after confirming its view that the SSR proposal would
take time to implement, the N.A.S.D.'s Board of Governors stated 0 that the
self-regulatory machinery of the future need not await the establishment of a
national market system.' 7
To date, however, the N.A.S.D.'s comments and proposals have not been
widely endorsed or accepted by its regulatory counterparts in the securities
industry, the registered national and regional stock exchanges. Essentially,
their consensus reaction has been that an SSR is not necessary to eliminate
regulatory duplication in light of the Exchange Act's new provisions for
W8
allocation of self-regulatory responsibilities
and could even result in un9
favorable consequences. More specifically, the New York Stock Exchange
(N.Y.S.E.), after giving recognition to the indisputable merits of an SSR,
20
proffered the following summary of purported disadvantages of the concept:
the perpetuation of duplicative marketplace regulation; the advent of listed
companies no longer sharing in the cost of regulation; the institution of a
system of centralized regulation which is compatible only with a highly
centralized market system; the creation of potential conflict between the
SSR and the regulators of the marketplace; the elimination of incentives
for innovative and efficient regulation; the nonrecognition of inherent inter75-677, 52 Stat. 1070 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78o-3 (1964)). In addition to providing various
quotation and clearing services for its members, the N.A.S.D. polices the over-the-counter
securities markets under S.E.C. supervision and control. See also S.E.C. Release 2211. (Aug. 7,
1929),
14. N.A.S.D., Three Issues in the Development of a Central Securities Market System, pt.
1 at 18 (April 1976) (discussion paper).
15, Id., Preface at ii.
16. Hearings of the S.E.C. on the Implementation of Rule 17d-2 (1976) (statement of
Gordon S. Macklin, President of N.A.S.D.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Rule 17d-2].
17. A national market system, for purposes of best execution and freedom of access,
would electronically tie together the various marketplaces which currently operate separately
and without adequate reference to transactions in the same security taking place in other
markets. Such unification of the various trading and clearing facilities is consistent with the
development of uniform regulation administered by an SSR. See N.A.S.D., supra note 14, at

2,5.
18. Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§77d, 77x, 77yyy, 78a (1975)).
19. Hearings on Rule 17d-2, supra note 16, at 25, 29, and Schedule E (New Y'ork Stock
Exchange testimony). See 'ilso Midwest Stock Exchange Policy Statement on the Objectives,
Development and Governance of a National Market System, at 74-75. (July 15, 1978) (sub.
mitted to National Market Advisory Board in response to a request for comment) [hereinafter
cited as Midwest Stock Exchange Policy Statement].
20. Hearings on Rule 17d-2, supra note 16, Schedule E (New York Stock Exchange testimony).
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play between regulation of the marketplace and its users; and inconsistency
with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended in 1975, as sections 6
and 19 require the stock exchanges to be competent and effective regulators
and also, no legislative basis exists for requiring all broker/dealers to join an
2
SSR. 1
Presumably, the negative impact of these factors outweighs the acknowledged merits of an SSR such as the elimination of duplicative regulatory functions and the achievement of uniformity of rules, disciplinary procedures and
economies of scale. 22 Instead, the N.Y.S.E. favors the creation of a service
company, Securities Industry Service Company (SISCO), which would centralize all examining and reporting functions now performed by the SRO's,
but which would allow them to retain all of their present rulemaking and
regulatory responsibilities.23 SISCO would be an independent entity, financed
and controlled jointly by all SRO's which voluntarily participate. It would
provide fact-finding but not decision-making services under contract to par24
ticipating SRO's.
Another view propounded by the Midwest Stock Exchange, is that structural changes are not called for under the present scheme of self-regulation.
Although it supports an appropriate allocation of enforcement and surveillance responsibilities to eliminate unnecessary regulatory duplication, the
Midwest Stock Exchange would maintain the present system of multiple SRO's
operating independently and subject to S.E.C. oversight. This position flows
from the belief that the system is well suited for the competitive environment
of a national market system and for dealing with the significant policy questions facing the securities industry in the future.25
In a general climate of regulatory contraction, the opposition to the creation of an SSR and the suggestion for a SISCO alternative appear incongruous
and motivated primarily by the unspecified political considerations referred
to by the N.A.S.D. 26 For example, even though SISCO provides a means of
reducing regulatory overlap, it also invites the creation of yet another layer of
regulatory apparatus to be funded by an already overburdened securities industry. Although this proposal and other cooperative plans recently submitted
21. Id. at 24, 25, and Schedule E. These suggested disadvantages pose no insurmountable
obstacles. For example, Congress has frequently amended the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 in the public interest, most recently in 1975. By comparison, the revisions required to
allow for an SSR would be insignificant. Concerning the Exchange's claim that listed companies would no longer share in the cost of regulation, it is unlikely that issuers in a consolidated quotation system would be immune from reasonable entry and maintenance fees.
The remaining purported disadvantages could probably be minimized by efficient professional
management.
22. See note 15 supraand accompanying text.
23. Hearingson Rule 17d-2, supra note 16, at 14 (New York Stock Exchange testimony).
24. Id.
25. See Midwest Stock Exchange Policy Statement, supra note 19, at 75. The Midwest
Stock Exchange concluded that an SRO's role in a national market system should not be
significantly different from what it is today. Better coordination and the elimination of
duplicative regulation are clearly desirable, but these can be achieved under the present
provisions of the Exchange Act. Id. at 76.
26. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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by the exchanges in accordance with S.E.C. Rules 17d-2 and 19g2-1, 27 considerably diminish regulatory duplication, they have little impact on regulatory expense because existing self-regulatory bureaucracies would remain
essentially intact. Similarly, the uniformity features of an SSR would not be
meaningfully advanced because control of the rulemaking and disciplinary
machinery would be retained by separate self-regulatory organizations. The
drawbacks28 to the SSR concept suggest no insurmountable hurdles. With
dynamic and professional management, effective S.E.C. supervision, and
appropriate amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 the purported disadvantages could easily be rectified.
There are two major underlying concerns of the major exchanges which
explain their reticence on the SSR concept. One represents the inevitable
survival fears experienced by entrenched regulatory staffs and specialists. In
addition to their normal concerns about the characteristics of the future
marketplace, the specialists are apprehensive about rulemaking and surveillance which might emanate from unfamiliar, less predictable quarters. Although most proposals for an SSR, including that of the N.A.S.D., leave market
center regulation to those actually operating it, effective monitoring and
surveillance would require an intermediary working with a designated selfregulator to prevent the development of any regulatory gaps.
The second underlying concern, and perhaps a more significant one, is that
acceptance of an SSR would prematurely presage a highly centralized market
center which would threaten the present auction market of the specialist
system. Historically, the exchange community has rejected any proposal which
tends, however remotely, to facilitate a national market system in which offfloor trading in listed securities is eased or accommodated.30 Without denigrating the merits of the auction market system, it is doubtful that an SSR, by
itself, would cause or even facilitate the development of a highly centralized
negotiated market apparatus. Presumably, the efficacy of an ultimate national
market system will be determined on the basis of more comprehensive economic data, particularly in the area of liquidity impact, and not on the basis
of the existing regulatory framework. Nonetheless, the apprehensions experienced by the major exchanges may be reflected in the so-called political
considerations which could delay implementation of the SSR concept.31 It is
equally clear that this blend of regulatory and economic self-interest could
present an imposing obstacle to any meaningful changes in the status quo.
27. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
28. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
29. The basic statutory revision would be a requirement that all broker/dealers join an
SSR. Furthermore, each national securities exchange presumably would be required to eliminate most of its rules and regulatory functions, including disciplinary procedures. Hearings
on Rule 17d-2, supra note 16, at 25 (New York Stock Exchange testimony).
30. Witness N.Y.S.E. resistance to S.E.C. efforts to rescind Exchange Rules 390 and 394(b),
which severely restrict off-floor transactions in listed securities by Exchange members. See
N.Y.S.E. GumE (CCH) 3652. Rule 894 was ultimately rescinded on March 31, 1976. Id. at
3669. See also S.E.C. Release 8791, issued Dec. 31, 1969, in connection with N.Y.S.E. Rule 394;
N.Y.S.E. Const. art. XIV, §8; N.Y.S.E. Member Firm Circular 52.
31. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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There seems little doubt, however, about the inexorable trend toward a
central market system. Although its eventual contour is uncertain and highly
complex, this observer believes that an SSR would be desirable and beneficial,
no matter what the configuration of the national market system. If the parties
involved can be so convinced, the heretofore tandem issues of market center
and regulatory framework can be safely disengaged.
It appears indisputable that if the national market center evolves with
highly centralized characteristics, an SSR would be the most efficient and
effective method of assuring uniformity and economy in regulation. Indeed,
the N.Y.S.E., in assessing the negative impact of the SSR, concedes that the
32
SSR is compatible only with a highly centralized market system. If this is
true, and if the exchanges can be assured that economic and not regulatory
factors will determine the parameters of the ultimate marketplace, the only
remaining consideration is the viability of an SSR if the market system retains
its present characteristics.
There is little disagreement that some economies of scale would result from
the creation of an SSR; only the extent of the savings is in dispute.3 3 However,
34
most interested parties acknowledge that the amount is not insignificant.
Inevitably, some of these economies would result from diminution of regulatory staffs, but the impact of such displacement can be minimized either by
attrition and/or retention of those personnel with unique expertise in floor
and auction procedures. Significantly, few, if any, of the cooperative regulatory
plans submitted to the S.E.C. by the exchanges pursuant to Rule 17d-2 suggest
any meaningful reduction in cost of regulation through staff curtailment. One
plan with potential for savings, however, is a proposal of the N.Y.S.E. which
allocates the regulatory responsibilities of American Stock Exchange-N.Y.S.E.
dual members.3 5 Under this proposal, the N.Y.S.E. would accept several responsibilities: processing applications of personnel; handling inquiries and
complaints; processing and approving partnership, corporate, and financial
documents; conducting field examinations; and handling disciplinary procedures. The American Stock Exchange would handle matters and material
which relate to their own seatholders, registered options principals, and trades
made on the Amex.3 6 This proposal, as well as others which could be expanded
to include the remaining regional exchanges, clearly reduces regulatory overlap. However, its division of effort appears to leave established regulatory
bureaucracies undisturbed.
The benefits of uniformity in rulemaking and elimination of duplicative
regulatory function in all non-marketplace activities are also readily acknowledged by those exchanges which have commented on the SSR proposal.3 7 Al32. Hearings on Rule 17d-2, supra note 16, Schedule E (New York Stock Exchange
testimony).
33. SEc. REc. & L. REP. (BNA) AA-23 (1977).
34. See Midwest Stock Exchange Policy Statement, supra note 19, at 75.
35. Hearings on Rule 17d-2, supra note 16, at 12 (New York Stock Exchange testimony).
36. Id.
37. The N.Y.S.E., in its summary of possible advantages of an SSR, included the following: elimination of duplicative regulatory functions in all non-marketplace activities, achievement of uniformity in rules for all non-marketplace activities, provision of comprehensive
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though their comments indicate reservations about duplicative marketplace
regulation or potential conflict between an SSR and marketplace regulators,
it appears that the exchanges are more genuinely concerned with the unfettered continuity of the existing market systems. Undoubtedly, an effective
interface between the two could be achieved in a manner that avoids any
undue interference. Self-regulation by definition merges the regulators and
regulated with the objective of accommodating the best interests of the marketplace, the broker/dealer, and the public investor. There is even the possibility
that if off-floor transactions in listed securities continue to proliferate, the
uniformity of standards governing all broker/dealers might result in certain
benefits for existing specialists who participate more actively in developing
those standards through the self-regulatory machinery38 Ironically, a majority
of the N.A.S.D.'s Board of Governors, which has taken the lead in advocating
a single-regulator theory, consists of principals of various stock exchange member firms.
Recently, there has been some gradual but perceptible movement in the direction of an SSR. The Pacific, Boston and Cincinnati Stock Exchanges have
each signed agreements, subject to S.E.C. approval, giving the N.A.S.D. regulatory responsibility over their dual members.3 9 These exchanges have agreed to
allow the N.A.S.D. to assume full responsibility for conducting on-site examinations, financial and operational surveillance, and monitoring of required
reports for dual. members. Under the agreements, the N.A.S.D. could also be
authorized to conduct enforcement proceedings for violations of the rules of
the exchanges, subject to the exchanges' right of first refusal. The exchanges,
however, would retain the duties of surveillance and control of floor activities
and would thus conduct their own enforcement proceedings for violations in
this area. 40
Notwithstanding this retention by the exchanges of marketplace regulation
and the absence of any allowance for an interface with "upstairs" N.A.S.D.
investigative activity, this experiment represents a significant step toward
elimination of regulatory duplication. In addition, this new program marks
a trend, however tentative, toward the other desirable benefits of uniformity
and economy. Extension of these provisions to non-participating exchanges
would facilitate a cautious and deliberate transition to sole self-regulation
while preserving marketplace control and first refusal rights of exchanges for
enforcement of their own regulatory rules.
To date, no particular organization has openly been recommended for the
role of an SSR, presumably because of the anticipated vigorous dissent of the
overall view of broker/dealers' non-marketplace activities, creation of a central body of expertise and achievement of economies of Scale. See Hearings on Rule I7d-2, supra note 16,

Schedule E (New York Stock Exchange testimony).
38. For example, the specialists could insist upon more rigid standards of entry into the
national market system by "market makers." Also, they could urge a definition of "market
maker" which would assure greater liquidity than heretofore has been the case for "market
makers" in the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations
(N.A.S.D.A.Q.) System.
39. N.A.S.D. Newsletter, Vol. XXXVII, No. 2, at 3 (June 1977).
40.

Id.
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others. Although the N.A.S.D. possesses many desirable characteristics for this
office and seems willing to accept SSR status, it has scrupulously avoided any
appearance that it is campaigning for the position. Its reticence is explainable
in part by its sensitivity to industry identification with the negotiated characteristics of the over-the-counter market, notwithstanding the fact that seventeen of its twenty-seven member Board of Governors are principals of one or
more of the national or regional stock exchange member firms.
The N.Y.S.E. also has the resources and ingenuity to extend its already cooperative regulatory activities into the over-the-counter areas of its own members and to assume complete enforcement responsibility for dual N.Y.S.E.regional member firms. It presently conducts joint examinations with the
N.A.S.D. of their dual members in a genuine effort to avoid overlapping or
duplicative regulation. In contrast to the N.A.S.D., however, it has shown little
inclination to expand its regulatory activities to encompass the broad spectrum
of over-the-counter and mutual fund broker/dealers who are not members of
any auction market facility. This factor may leave the N.A.S.D. as the most
appropriate in-place enforcement agency with the will and the ability to
expeditiously transform itself into the designated SSR. It combines a geographically balanced and efficient district office system with a readily available pool
of examining and supervisory personnel. In addition to its existing responsibility to police over-the-counter and mutual fund activities of ExchangeN.A.S.D. dual members, it is further mandated by law to oversee certain
activities in the municipal bond and investment company areas.41 Further,
through a continuously changing Board of Governors, the organization is
sufficiently dynamic to adjust to the ultimate apparatus of any central market
system, even if it retains many of its present auction market characteristics. As
it has in the past, 42 the Board can be expanded or amended to reflect its

constituency, including specialist, if the present system continues and/or if an
interface with possible market center regulators becomes necessary. Staff adjustments can be readily accomplished through training or by rehiring existing
exchange personnel who fall victim to the anticipated consolidations.
Finally, historical chronology of enforcement activities of the various selfregulatory bodies may explain the somewhat more aggressive enforcement
psychology of the N.A.S.D. The Association was initially organized exclusively
as a self-regulatory agency in the securities industry.43 Only later, through
the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations
(N.A.S.D.A.Q.), 44 did it develop a market center capability. On the other hand,
41. See Hearings on Rule 17d-2, supra note 16, at 3 (statement of Gordon S. Macklin,
President of N.A.S.D.).
42. In the early 1970's, the N.A.S.D. increased the representation on its Board of Governors from the insurance industry to accommodate the increased involvement of its members
in sales of variable annuities and variable life policies. See N.A.S.D. ANN. RFP. 9 (1973).
43. See S.E.C. Release 2211 (Aug. 7, 1939).
44. The N.A.S.D.A.Q. System is an interconnection of computers, communications devices, and terminals tied together by communications lines. It is designed to serve the overthe-counter market by introducing automation while retaining the fundamental negotiated
characteristics of that market. See N.A.S.D., supra note 14, at 21; N.A.S.D. Manual By-Laws
art. XVI, §1, at 1133.
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the exchanges were created solely as market centers and only subesquently
and collaterally developed a regulatory capacity.

In general, the reasoning in support of an expedited adoption of the SSR
concept is irresistible. The countervailing arguments are less substantive than
self-serving, and tend to obfuscate the underlying political concerns constituting the actual barriers to implementation. An informed industry hierarchy,
however, should soon recognize and override these impediments which are
anachronistic and obstructive in a general climate of regulatory contraction
and sumptuary constraints. The unassailable benefits of uniformity and economy embodied in the SSR concept should soon spur an already financially
strained industry to alleviative action.
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